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Abstract—A wiretap protocol is a pair of randomized encoding
and decoding functions such that knowledge of a bounded
fraction of the encoding of a message reveals essentially no
information about the message, while knowledge of the entire
encoding reveals the message using the decoder. In this paper we
study the notion of efficiently invertible extractors and show that
a wiretap protocol can be constructed from such an extractor.
We will then construct invertible extractors for symbol-fixing,
affine, and general sources and apply them to create wiretap
protocols with asymptotically optimal trade-offs between their
rate (ratio of the length of the message versus its encoding) and
resilience (ratio of the observed positions of the encoding and the
length of the encoding). We will then apply our results to create
wiretap protocols for challenging communication problems, such
as active intruders who change portions of the encoding, network
coding, and intruders observing arbitrary boolean functions of
the encoding.
As a by-product of our constructions we obtain new explicit
extractors for a restricted family of affine sources over large
fields (that in particular generalizes the notion of symbol-fixing
sources) which is of independent interest. These extractors are
able to extract the entire source entropy with zero error.
Keywords: Wiretap Channel, Extractors, Network Coding,
Active Intrusion, Exposure Resilient Cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
SUPPOSE that Alice wants to send a message to Bobthrough a communication channel, and that the message
is partially observable by an intruder. This scenario arises in
various practical situations. For instance, in a packet network,
the sequence transmitted by Alice through the channel can
be fragmented into small packets at the source and/or along
the way. Then, different packets might be routed through
different paths in the network in which an intruder may have
compromised some of the intermediate routers. An example
that is similar in spirit is furnished by transmission of a
piece of information from multiple senders to one receiver,
across different delivery media, such as satellite, wireless,
and/or wired networks. Due to limited resources, a potential
intruder may be able to observe only a fraction of the lines of
transmission, and hence only partially observe the message.
As another example, one can consider secure storage of data
on a distributed medium that is physically accessible in parts
by an intruder, or a sensitive file on a hard drive that is erased
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from the file system but is only partially overwritten with new
or random information, and hence, is partially exposed to a
malicious party.
An obvious approach to solve this problem is to use a secret
key to encrypt the information at the source. However, almost
all practical cryptographic techniques are shown to be secure
only under unproven hardness assumptions and the assumption
that the intruder possesses bounded computational power. This
might be undesirable in certain situations. Moreover, the key
agreement problem has its own challenges.
In this paper, we assume the intruder to be information
theoretically limited, and our goal will be to employ this
limitation and construct a protocol that provides unconditional,
information-theoretic security, even in the presence of a com-
putationally unbounded adversary.
The problem described above was first formalized by
Wyner [1] and subsequently by Ozarow and Wyner [2] as an
information-theoretic problem. In its most basic setting, this
problem is known as the wiretap II problem (the description
given here follows from [2]):
Consider a communication system with a source
which outputs a sequence X = (X1, . . . , Xm) in
{0, 1}m uniformly at random. A randomized algo-
rithm, called the encoder, maps the output of the
source to a binary string Y ∈ {0, 1}n. The output
of the encoder is then sent through a noiseless
channel (called the direct channel) and is eventually
delivered to a decoder1 D which maps Y back to
X . Along the way, an intruder arbitrarily picks a
subset S ⊆ [n] := {1, . . . , n} of size t ≤ n, and is
allowed to observe2 W := Y |S (through a so-called
wiretap channel), i.e., Y on the coordinate positions
corresponding to the set S. The goal is to make sure
that the intruder learns as little as possible about X ,
regardless of the choice of S.
The system defined above is illustrated in Fig. 1. The
security of the system is defined by the following conditional
entropy, known as “equivocation”:
∆ := min
S : |S|=t
H(X|W ).
When ∆ = H(X) = m, the intruder obtains no information
about the transmitted message and we have perfect privacy
in the system. Moreover, when ∆ → m as m → ∞, we
call the system asymptotically perfectly private. These two
1Ozarow and Wyner also consider the case in which the decoder errs with
negligible probability, but we are going to consider only error-free decoders.
2 For a vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and a subset S ⊆ [n], we denote
by x|S the vector of length |S| that is obtained from x by removing all the
coordinates xi, i /∈ S.
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Fig. 1. The Wiretap II Problem.
cases correspond to what is known in the literature as “strong
secrecy”. A weaker requirement (known as “weak secrecy”)
would be to have m−∆ = o(m).
Remark 1. The assumption that X is sampled from a uni-
formly random source should not be confused with the fact
that Alice is transmitting one particular message to Bob that
is fixed and known to her before the transmission. In this
case, the randomness of X in the model captures the a priori
uncertainty about X for the outside world, and in particular
the intruder, but not the transmitter.
As an intuitive example, suppose that a random key is
agreed upon between Alice and a trusted third party, and now
Alice wishes to securely send her particular key to Bob over
a wiretapped channel. Or, assume that Alice wishes to send
an audio stream to Bob that is encoded and compressed using
a conventional audio encoding method.
Furthermore, the particular choice of the distribution on
X as a uniformly random sequence will cause no loss of
generality. If the distribution of X is publicly known to be
non-uniform, the transmitter can use a suitable source-coding
scheme to compress the source to its entropy prior to the
transmission, and ensure that from the intruder’s point of view,
X is uniformly distributed. On the other hand, it is also easy
to see that if a protocol achieves perfect privacy under uniform
message distribution, it achieves perfect privacy under any
other distribution as well.
The main focus of this paper is on asymptotic trade-offs
between the rate R := m/n and the resilience δ := t/n of an
asymptotically perfectly private wiretap coding scheme. We
will focus on the case where the fraction δ of the symbols
observed by the intruder is an arbitrary constant below 1,
which is the most interesting range in our context. However,
some of our constructions work for sub-constant 1−δ as well.
Following [2], it is easy to see that, for resilience δ, an
information-theoretic bound R ≤ 1 − δ + o(1) must hold.
Lower bounds for R in terms of δ have been studied by a
number of researchers.
For the case of perfect privacy (where the equivocation ∆ is
exactly equal to the message length), Ozarow and Wyner [2]
give a wiretap coding scheme using linear error-correcting
codes, and show that the existence of an [n, k, d]q-code implies
the existence of a perfectly private wiretap coding scheme with
message length k and block length n (thus, rate k/n) and
resilience δ = (d− 1)/n.
As a result, the so-called Gilbert-Varshamov bound on the
rate-distance trade-offs of linear codes [3], [4] implies that,
asymptotically, R ≥ 1− hq(δ), where hq is the q-ary entropy
function defined as
hq(x) := x logq(q − 1)− x logq(x)− (1− x) logq(1− x).
If q ≥ 49 is a square, the bound can be further improved to
R ≥ 1 − δ − 1/(√q − 1) using Goppa’s algebraic-geometric
codes [5], [6].
Moving away from perfect to asymptotically perfect privacy,
it was (implicitly) shown in [7] that for any γ > 0 there
exist binary asymptotically perfectly private wiretap coding
schemes with R ≥ 1− 2δ − γ and exponentially small error.
This bound strictly improves the coding-theoretic bound of
Ozarow and Wyner for the binary alphabet.
A. Overview of our Results
In this paper we prove several lower bounds for the rate
of asymptotically perfectly private wiretap protocols with
negligible, i.e., superpolynomially small, error. This is shown
constructively; i.e., by demonstrating polynomial-time com-
putable encoding and decoding schemes that achieve the lower
bounds. Our main tool is the design of various types of
invertible extractors, a concept defined in Section V.
The formal model that our results are based on is defined in
Section III. As we will see, this model is more stringent than
the original Wiretap II problem. In Section IV, we review a
known construction of symbol-fixing extractors based on linear
codes. Then we extend this result to the case of “restricted”
affine sources, using rank-metric codes. Using these extractors,
we are able to recover Ozarow and Wyner’s coding-based
wiretap schemes as well as a recent construction of wiretap
schemes for network coding (due to Silva and Kschischang
[8], discussed in Section VIII-B) in our framework.
Our next construction, described in Section VI, shows that
if the alphabet size is d, then there exists αd ∈ (0, 1) such that
for every η > 0 and every constant resilience δ ∈ [0, 1), we
essentially have rate R ≥ max{αd(1− δ), 1− δ/αd}−η with
exponentially small error. This is achieved by suitably modify-
ing the symbol-fixing extractor of Kamp and Zuckerman [9].
Contrary to the coding theoretic construction of Ozarow and
Wyner, for a fixed alphabet size our bound gives a positive
rate for every constant resilience δ ∈ [0, 1).
Even though the bound in Section VI is superceded by our
main result in Section VII, we have included it because of its
3simplicity and potential for practical use3. Our second bound
(Theorem 29) matches the information-theoretic upper bound
of Ozarow and Wyner. Namely, for any prime power alphabet
size q, and any resilience δ ∈ [0, 1), we construct a wiretap
protocol with superpolynomially small error, zero leakage and
rate ≥ 1 − δ − o(1). In fact, this bound holds in a more
general setting in which the intruder is not only allowed to
look at a δ-fraction of the symbols of Alice’s message, but is
also allowed to perform any linear preprocessing of Alice’s
message before doing so. The power of this result stems
largely from a black box transformation which makes certain
seedless extractors invertible. More specifically, the results of
this section are obtained by applying this transformation to
certain affine extractors. A plot of the bounds (which also
compares our bounds with those obtained in other relevant
works) can be found in Fig. 2.
In sections VIII-A and VIII-B, we will demonstrate several
important applications of this fact in the context of network
coding as well as wiretapped communication in the presence of
noise and active intruders. In particular we provide, for the first
time, an optimal solution to the wiretap problem in network
coding [11] without imposing any restrictions (such as a large
alphabet or packet length, or any change in the network code).
We remark that our coding scheme adds a privacy layer to any
existing network coding scheme as an outer code, without
affecting the existing code being used. Thus, the resulting
network coding scheme may be made resilient against noise
(or active intruders) if the original network code can handle
errors.
The final application in Section VIII-C studies an all-
powerful intruder who is only limited by the amount of
information he can obtain from Alice’s encoded message, and
not by the nature of the observations. By inverting seeded
extractors with nearly-optimal output lengths, we will show
that if Alice and Bob have access to a side channel over
which Alice can publicly send a polylogarithmic number of
bits to Bob (that can be seen by the eavesdropper), then their
communication on the main channel can be made secure even
if the intruder can access the values of any t Boolean functions
of Alice’s encoded message.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND BASIC FACTS
A. Notation and Probability Distributions
For a prime power q, we use Fq to denote the finite field
with q elements. We will occasionally use the notation F2 for
the set {0, 1}, even if we do not need to use the field structure.
For a positive integer n, define [n] as the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
For a vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and a subset S ⊆ [n],
we denote by x|S the vector of length |S| that is obtained
from x by removing all the coordinates xi, i /∈ S. For an
integer k > 0, we will use the notation Uk for the uniform
distribution on Fk2 . More generally, for a finite set Ω, we will
3 The construction in Section VI has other features that are not offered
by the result in Section VII. For example, this construction achieves an
exponentially small error (see Definition 4) and can handle any alphabet size
larger than 2. In contract, our explicit construction in Section VII offers super-
polynomially small error and can only be defined for alphabet sizes that are
prime powers.
use UΩ for the uniform distribution on Ω. For a function f ,
we denote by f−1(x) the set of the preimages of x, i.e., the
set {y : f(y) = x}. We denote the probability measure defined
by a distribution X by PrX , hence, PrX (x) and PrX [S] for
x ∈ Ω and S ⊆ Ω denote the probability that X assigns to an
outcome x and an event S, respectively. We will use X|S to
denote the conditional distribution of X restricted to the set
(event) S, and X ∼ X to denote that a random variable X is
distributed according to X .
Definition 2. The support of a distribution is the set of all
the elements of the sample space to which it assigns nonzero
probabilities. The min-entropy of a distribution X with finite
support S is defined as
H∞(X ) := min
x∈S
{− log Pr
X
(x)},
where typically log(·) is the logarithm function in base 2.
However, when X is supported on a set of d-ary strings, we
find it more convenient to use the logarithm function in base
d and measure the entropy in d-ary symbols instead of bits.
The Shannon entropy of the distribution, on the other hand, is
defined as
H(X ) :=
∑
x∈S
(−Pr
X
(x) log Pr
X
(x)).
When a distribution defined on the set of n-bit strings has
min-entropy k, the quantity k/n defines the entropy rate of
the distribution. Note that the above definition immediately
implies that the min-entropy of a distribution is upper bounded
by its Shannon entropy (which is in fact the “expectation” of
the logarithm of the probabilities). Hence, if the min-entropy
of a distribution is at least h, its Shannon-entropy is also at
least h. These two measures however coincide for uniform
distributions.
Definition 3. The statistical distance (or total variation dis-
tance) of two distributions X and Y defined on the same finite
space S is given by
1
2
∑
s∈S
|Pr
X
(s)− Pr
Y
(s)|,
and is denoted by dist(X ,Y). Note that this is half the `1
distance of the two distributions when regarded as vectors of
probabilities over S.
It can be shown that the statistical distance of the two
distributions is at most  if and only if for every T ⊆ S, we
have |PrX [T ]−PrY [T ]| ≤ . When the statistical distance of
X and Y is at most , they are said to be -close and this is
denoted by X ∼ Y .
While we defined the above terms for probability distri-
butions, with a slight abuse of notation we may use them
interchangeably for random variables as well.
III. THE FORMAL MODEL
The model that we consider in this work is motivated by
the original wiretap channel problem but is more stringent
in terms of its security requirements. In particular, instead
of using Shannon entropy as a measure of uncertainty, we
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Fig. 2. A comparison of the rate vs. resilience trade-offs achieved by the wiretap protocols for the binary alphabet (left) and larger alphabets (right, in this
example of size 64). (1) Information-theoretic bound, attained by Theorem 29; (2) The bound approached by [7]; (3) Protocol based on best non-explicit
binary linear codes [3], [4]; (4) The construction of [10] (based on all-or-nothing transforms), assuming that the underlying exposure-resilient function is
optimal (see Appendix A for a discussion); (5) Random walk protocol of Corollary 23, using a Ramanujan graph; (6) Protocol based on the best known
explicit [6] and non-explicit [3], [4] linear codes.
will rely on statistical indistinguishability which is a stronger
measure that is more widely used in cryptography.
Definition 4. Let Σ be a set of size4 d, parameters m and n
be positive integers, and , γ > 0. A (t, , γ)d-resilient wiretap
protocol of block length n and message length m is a pair of
functions E : Σm×{0, 1}r → Σn (the encoder) and D : Σn →
Σm (the decoder) that are computable in time polynomial in
m, such that
(a) (Decodability) For all x ∈ Σm and all z ∈ {0, 1}r we
have D(E(x, z)) = x,
(b) (Resiliency) Let X ∼ UΣm , Z ∼ Ur, and Y :=
E(X,Z). For a set S ⊆ [n] and w ∈ Σ|S|, let XS,w
denote the distribution of X conditioned on the event
Y |S = w. Define the set of bad observations as
BS := {w ∈ Σ|S| | dist(XS,w,UΣm) > },
where dist(·, ·) denotes the statistical distance between
two distributions. Then we require that for every S ⊆ [n]
of size at most t, Pr[Y |S ∈ BS ] ≤ γ.
The encoding of a vector x ∈ Σk is accomplished by choos-
ing a vector Z ∈ {0, 1}r uniformly at random, and calculating
E(x, Z). The quantities R := m/n, , and γ are called the
rate, the error, and the leakage of the protocol, respectively.
Moreover, we call δ := t/n the (relative) resilience of the
protocol.
The decodability condition ensures that the functions E and
D are a matching encoder/decoder pair, while the resiliency
conditions ensures that the intruder learns almost nothing
about the message from his observation.
In our definition, the imperfection of the protocol is captured
by the two parameters  and γ. When  = γ = 0, the above
definition coincides with the original wiretap channel problem
(as defined by Ozarow and Wyner [2] and described in the
introduction) for the case of perfect privacy.
4Throughout the paper, when the alphabet size is a prime power, we find
it more convenient to use the symbol q for the alphabet size.
When γ = 0, we will have a worst-case guarantee, namely,
that the intruder’s views of the message before and after his
observation are statistically close, regardless of the outcome
of the observation.
The protocol remains interesting even when γ is positive
but sufficiently small. When γ > 0, a particular observation
might potentially reveal to the intruder a lot of information
about the message. However, a negligible γ will ensure that
such a bad event (or leakage) happens only with negligible
probability.
All the constructions that we will study in this paper achieve
zero leakage (i.e., γ = 0), except for the general result in
Section VIII-C for which a nonzero leakage is inevitable.
The significance of zero-leakage protocols is that they
assure adaptive resiliency in the weak sense introduced in
[12] for exposure-resilient functions. Notice that the resiliency
condition in Definition 4 can be interpreted as follows: Sup-
pose that the intruder fixes the subset S of the positions to be
observed before the protocol runs. Then, when the encoded
string Y is created from the message, the intruder learns the
subsequence W := Y |S . Now, suppose that at this point a third
party called “the challenger” randomly presents the intruder
with a string that is either a uniformly random string or the
original message X (where the two cases are equally likely).
The resiliency condition of Definition 4 essentially ensures
that the intruder will not be able to distinguish between the
two cases better than a random guess (simply because the
distribution of X conditioned on the observation is statistically
close to uniform). However, in general, some “bad” outcomes
of W may reveal non-negligible information about X to the
intruder (by definition, this happens with a small probability
γ). Now consider an adaptive intruder who does not fix S
beforehand, but observes W adaptively after the encoding Y
is created. This means that the choice of each query made
by the intruder may depend on the outcome of the previous
queries (i.e., those positions in W that are already revealed).
Now in this adaptive setting, the intruder has enough power
to potentially direct the observation towards bad outcomes,
5by choosing the query positions smartly. However, when the
leakage parameter γ is zero, we can ensure that this cannot
happen and the intruder will not be able to respond the
challenge much better than a random guess even when allowed
to make adaptive queries.
In general, it is straightforward to verify that our model
can be used to solve the original wiretap II problem, with
∆ ≥ m(1− − γ):
Lemma 5. Suppose that (E,D) is an encoder/decoder pair as
in Definition 4. Then using E and D in the wiretap II problem
attains an equivocation
∆ ≥ m(1− − γ).
Proof: Let W := Y |S be the intruder’s observation, and
denote by W ′ the set of good observations, namely,
W ′ := {w ∈ Σt : dist(XS,w,UΣm) ≤ }.
Denote by H(·) the Shannon entropy in d-ary symbols. Then
we will have
H(X|W ) =
∑
w∈Σt
Pr(W = w)H(X|W = w)
≥
∑
w∈W ′
Pr(W = w)H(X|W = w)
(a)
≥
∑
w∈W ′
Pr(W = w)(1− )m
(b)
≥ (1− γ)(1− )m ≥ (1− γ − )m.
The inequality (a) follows from the definition of W ′ combined
with Proposition 36 in the appendix, and (b) by the definition
of the leakage parameter.
Hence, we will achieve asymptotically perfect privacy when
+ γ = o(1/m). For all the protocols that we present in this
work this quantity will be superpolynomially small; that is,
smaller than 1/mc for every positive constant c (provided that
m is large enough).
There are several interrelated notions in the literature on
Cryptography and Theoretical Computer Science that are
also closely related to our definition of the wiretap protocol
(Definition 4). These are resilient functions (RF) and almost
perfect resilient functions (APRF), exposure-resilient functions
(ERF), and all-or-nothing transforms (AONT) (cf. [13], [14],
[15], [16], [17], [10], [7] and [18] for a comprehensive account
of several important results in this area). We have included a
short survey of these notions that includes a comparisons with
our model in Appendix A.
Among these, the notion of AONTs is the most relevant
to our work. Roughly speaking, an AONT is an efficiently
invertible randomized function mapping {0, 1}m to {0, 1}n
(n ≥ m) such that the joint distribution of the output bits on
any set of up to t coordinate positions is (nearly) independent
of the input. As discussed in Appendix A, AONTs can be used
in the original wiretap II model as the encoder/decoder pair.
However, this notion turns out to be stronger than our notion
of wiretap protocols and the best known explicit constructions
of AONTs achieve a substantially sub-optimal rate/resilience
tradeoff (see Fig. 2).
IV. RANDOMNESS EXTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTIONS
A combinatorial tool that is of central importance in our
constructions of wiretap protocols is the notion of randomness
extractors. In this section, we first review some standard
definitions and facts in the theory of randomness extractors
that are relevant to our work (Section IV-A). We refer the
reader to [19] for a more detailed account of these notions.
Then, in Section IV-B we present some explicit constructions
that will be used for explicit construction of perfectly private
wiretap protocols.
A. Preliminaries on Extractors
Before we present a formal definition of randomness ex-
tractors, we define families of random sources, as follows.
Definition 6. Let Σ be a finite set of size d > 1. An (n, k)d
family of d-ary randomness sources of length n and min-
entropy k is a set F of probability distributions on Σn such
that every X ∈ F has d-ary min-entropy at least k .
There are numerous natural families of sources that have
been introduced and studied in the theory of randomness
extractors. In this work, besides the general family of dis-
tributions with high min-entropy, we will focus on the family
of symbol-fixing and affine sources, defined below.
Definition 7. An (n, k)d symbol-fixing source is the distribu-
tion of a random variable
X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) ∈ Σn,
for some set Σ of size d, in which at least k of the coor-
dinates (chosen arbitrarily) are uniformly and independently
distributed on Σ and the rest take deterministic values.
When d = 2, we will have a binary symbol-fixing source,
or simply a bit-fixing source. In this case Σ = {0, 1}, and the
subscript d is dropped from the notation.
Definition 8. For a prime power q, the family of q-ary k-
dimensional affine sources of length n is the set of distributions
on Fnq , each uniformly distributed on an affine translation of
some k-dimensional sub-space of Fnq .
Affine sources are natural generalizations of symbol-fixing
sources when the alphabet size is a prime power. It is easy
to see that the q-ary min-entropy of a k-dimensional affine
source is k.
Definition 9. A function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}m is
a strong seeded (k, )-extractor if for every distribution X on
{0, 1}n with min-entropy at least k, random variable X ∼ X
and a seed Z ∼ Ur, the distribution of (f(X,Z), Z) is -
close to Um+r. An extractor is explicit if it is polynomial-time
computable.
A strong extractor f(x, z) for a source X with error 2
satisfies the property that for all but a  fraction of the choices
of the seed z, the distribution of f(X , z) is -close to uniform.
This is easily seen by an averaging argument.
For more restricted sources (in particular, symbol-fixing
and affine sources), seedless (or deterministic) extraction is
possible.
6Definition 10. Let Σ be a finite alphabet of size d > 1. A
function f : Σn → Σm is a (seedless) (k, )d-extractor for
a family F of (n, k)d sources (defined on Σn) if for every
distribution X ∈ F with d-ary min-entropy at least k, the
distribution f(X ) is -close to UΣm . A seedless extractor is
explicit if it is polynomial-time constructible.
Over large fields, the following affine extractor due to
Gabizon and Raz extract almost the entire source entropy:
Theorem 11. [20] There is a constant q0 such that for
any prime power field size q and integers n, k such that
q > max{q0, n20}, there is an explicit affine (k, )q-extractor
GR : Fnq → Fk−1q , where  < q−1/21.
In this construction, the field size has to be polynomially
large in n. When the field size is small (in particular, constant),
the task becomes much more challenging. The most challeng-
ing case thus corresponds to the binary field F2, for which an
explicit affine extractor was obtained, when the input entropy
is a constant fraction of the input length, by Bourgain:
Theorem 12. [21] For every constant 0 < δ ≤ 1, there is an
explicit affine extractor AExt : Fn2 → Fm2 for min-entropy δn
with output length m = Ω(n) and error at most 2−Ω(m).
Bourgain’s construction was later simplified, improved, and
extended to work for arbitrary prime fields by Yehudayoff [22].
We remark that, for the case of binary field, one case also use a
more recent construction of affine extractors due to Li [23] that
obtains comparable parameters to Theorem 12 using simpler
techniques.
B. Symbol-Fixing and Affine Extractors from Codes
We now see simple constructions of zero-error, symbol-
fixing and affine extractors using linear functions arising
from good error-correcting codes. These extractors achieve
the lowest possible error, but however are unable to extract
the entire source entropy over small alphabets. Moreover, the
affine extractor only works for a “restricted” class of affine
sources. However, these extractors have the nice property
of being linear, a property that turns out to be useful for
our construction of explicit wiretap schemes discussed in the
following sections.
1) Symbol-Fixing Extractors from Linear Codes: The the-
orem below (proved, with a different terminology, in [13])
states that linear error-correcting codes can be used to obtain
symbol-fixing extractors with zero error.
Theorem 13. Let C be an [n, k˜, d]q code over Fq and G be a
k˜×n generator matrix of C. Then, the function E : Fnq → Fk˜q
defined as5 E(x) := Gx> is an (n− d+ 1, 0)q-extractor for
symbol-fixing sources over Fq .
Conversely, if a linear function E : Fnq → Fk˜q is an
(n− d+ 1, 0)q-extractor for symbol-fixing sources over Fq , it
corresponds to a generator matrix of an [n, k˜, d]q code.
5We typically consider vectors be represented in row form, and use the
transpose operator (x>) to represent column vectors.
Proof: Let X be a symbol-fixing source with a set S ⊆ [n]
of fixed coordinates, where6 |S| = d − 1, and define S¯ :=
[n] \ S. Observe that, by the Singleton bound, we must have
|S¯| = n− d+ 1 ≥ k˜.
The submatrix of G obtained by removing the columns
picked by S must have rank k˜. Since otherwise, the left kernel
of this submatrix would be nonzero, meaning that C has a
nonzero codeword that consists of entirely zeros at the d− 1
positions picked by S, contradicting the assumption that the
minimum distance of C is d. Therefore, the distribution E(X )
is supported on a k˜-dimensional affine space on Fk˜q , meaning
that this distribution is uniform.
The converse is straightforward by following the same
argument.
If the field size is large enough; e.g., q ≥ n, then one can
pick C in the above theorem to be an MDS code (in particular,
a Reed-Solomon code) to obtain a (k, 0)-extractor for all
symbol-fixing sources of entropy k with optimal output length
k. However, for a fixed q, negative results on the rate-distance
trade-offs of codes (e.g., Hamming and Plotkin bounds, as
well as the linear programming bound due to McEliece-
Rodemich-Rumsey-Welch, cf. [24, Chapter 5]) assert that this
construction of extractors must inevitably lose some fraction
of the entropy of the source. Moreover, the construction would
at best be able to extract some constant fraction of the source
entropy only if the entropy of the source (in q-ary symbols)
is above n/q.
2) Restricted Affine Extractors from Rank-Metric Codes: In
Section VIII, we will see that affine extractors can be used to
construct wiretap schemes for models that are more general
than the original Wiretap II problem, e.g., when the direct
channel is noisy. For these applications, the extractor needs to
additionally have a nice structure that is in particular offered
by linear functions.
An obvious observation is that a nontrivial affine extractor
cannot be a linear function. Indeed, a linear function f(x) :=
〈α, x〉 + β, where α, β, x ∈ Fnq , is constant on the (n − 1)-
dimensional orthogonal subspace of α, and thus, fails to be an
extractor for even (n−1)-dimensional affine spaces. However,
in this section we will see that linear affine extractors can be
constructed if the affine source is known to be described by a
set of linear constraints whose coefficients lie on a small sub-
field of the underlying field. Such restricted extractors turn
out to be sufficient for some of the applications that we will
consider.
Let Q be a prime power. Same as linear codes, an affine
subspace on FnQ can be represented by a generator matrix,
or parity-check matrix and a constant shift. That is, a k-
dimensional affine subspace A ⊆ FnQ can be described as
the image of a linear mapping
A := {xG+ β : x ∈ FkQ},
where G is a k× n generator matrix of rank k over FQ, and
β ∈ FnQ is a fixed vector. Alternatively, A can be expressed
6If the set of fixed symbols if of size smaller than d−1, the argument still
goes through by taking S as an arbitrary set of size d− 1 containing all the
fixed coordinates.
7as the translated null-space of a linear mapping
A := {x+ β ∈ FnQ : Hx> = 0},
for an (n−k)×n parity check matrix of rank n−k over FQ.
Observe that a symbol-fixing source over Fq with q-ary
min-entropy k can be seen as a k-dimensional affine source
with a generator matrix of the form [I | 0] ·P , where I is the
k×k identity matrix, 0 denotes the k×(n−k) all-zeros matrix,
and P is a permutation matrix. Recall that from Theorem 13
we know that for this restricted type of affine sources linear
extractors exist. In this section we generalize this idea.
Suppose that Q = qm for a prime power q so that FQ can
be regarded as a degree m extension of Fq (and isomorphic
to Fqm ). Let A be an affine source over FnQ. We will call the
affine source Fq-restricted if its support can be represented
by a generator matrix (or equivalently, a parity check matrix)
over Fq .
In this section we introduce an affine extractor that is FQ-
linear and, assuming that m is sufficiently large, extracts from
Fq-restricted affine sources. The construction of the extractor
is similar to Theorem 13, except that instead of an error-
correcting code defined over the Hamming metric, we will
use rank-metric codes.
Consider the function rdist : Fm×nq × Fm×nq → Z, where
Fm×nq denotes the set of m× n matrices over Fq , defined as
rdist(A,B) := rankq(A−B), where rankq is the matrix rank
over Fq . It is straightforward to see that rdist is a metric.
The usual notion of error-correcting codes defined under
the Hamming metric can be naturally extended to the rank
metric. In particular, a rank-metric code C can be defined
as a set of m × n matrices (known as codewords), whose
minimum distance is the minimum rank distance between pairs
of codewords.
For Q := qm, there is a natural correspondence between
m × n matrices over Fq and vectors of length n over FQ.
Consider an isomorphism ϕ : FQ → Fmq between FQ and
Fmq which maps elements of FQ to column vectors of length
m over Fq . Then one can define a mapping Φ: FnQ → Fm×nq
defined as
Φ(x1, . . . , xn) := [ϕ(x1) | · · · | ϕ(xn)]
to put the elements of FnQ in one-to-one correspondence with
m× n matrices over Fq .
A particular class of rank-metric codes are linear ones.
Suppose that C is a linear [n, k˜, d˜]Q code over FQ. Then, using
Φ(·), C can be regarded as a rank-metric code of dimension
k˜ over Fm×nq . In symbols, we will denote such a linear k˜-
dimensional rank-metric code as an [[n, k˜, d]]qm code, where
d is the minimum rank-distance of the code. The rank-distance
of a linear rank-metric code turns out to be equal to the
minimum rank of its nonzero codewords and obviously, one
must have d ≤ d˜. However, the Hamming distance of C might
turn out to be much larger than its rank distance when regarded
as a rank-metric code. In particular, d ≤ m, and thus, d must
be strictly smaller than d˜ when the degree m of the field
extension is less than d˜.
A counterpart of the Singleton bound in the rank-metric
states that, for any [[n, k˜, d]]qm code, one must have d ≤
n− k˜+1. Rank-metric codes that attain equality exist and are
called maximum rank distance (MRD) codes. A class of linear
rank-metric codes known as Gabidulin codes [25] are MRD
and can be thought of as the counterpart of Reed-Solomon
codes in the rank metric. In particular, the codewords of a
Gabidulin code, seen as vectors over the extension field, are
evaluation vectors of bounded-degree linearized polynomials
rather than arbitrary polynomials as in the case of Reed-
Solomon codes. These codes are defined for any choice of
n, k˜, q,m as long as m ≥ n and k˜ ≤ n.
The following is an extension of Theorem 13 to restricted
affine sources.
Theorem 14. Let C be an [[n, k˜, d]]qm code defined from a
code over FQ (where Q := qm) with a generator matrix G ∈
Fk˜×nQ . Then the function E : F
n
Q → Fk˜Q defined as E(x) :=
Gx> is an (n − d + 1, 0)-extractor for Fq-restricted affine
sources over FQ.
Conversely, if a linear function E : FnQ → Fk˜Q is an (n −
d+1, 0)-extractor for all Fq-restricted affine sources over FQ,
it corresponds to a generator matrix of an [[n, k˜, d]]qm code.
Proof: Consider a restricted affine source X uniformly
supported on an affine subspace of dimension7 n− d+ 1
X := {xA+ β : x ∈ Fn−d+1Q },
where A ∈ F(n−d+1)×nq has rank n − d + 1, and β ∈ FnQ is
a fixed translation. Note that k˜ ≤ n− d+ 1 by the Singleton
bound for rank-metric codes.
The output of the extractor is thus uniformly supported on
the affine subspace
B := {GA>x> +Gβ> : x ∈ Fn−d+1Q } ⊆ Fk˜Q.
Note that GA> ∈ Fk˜×(n−d+1)Q . Our goal is to show that the
dimension of B is equal to k˜. Suppose not, then we must have
rankQ(GA
>) < k˜. In particular, there is a nonzero y ∈ Fk˜Q
such that yGA> = 0.
Let Y := Φ(yG) ∈ Fm×nq , where Φ(·) is the isomorphism
that maps codewords of C to their matrix form over Fq . By
the distance of C, we know that rankq(Y ) ≥ d. Since m ≥ d,
this means that Y has at least d linearly independent rows. On
the other hand, we know that the matrix Y A> ∈ Fk˜×(n−d+1)q
is the zero matrix. Therefore, Y has d independent rows (each
in Fnq ) that are all orthogonal to the n − d + 1 independent
rows of A. Since d+ (n− d+ 1) > n, this is a contradiction.
Therefore, the dimension of B is exactly k˜, meaning that
the output distribution of the extractor is indeed uniform.
The converse is straightforward by following a similar line
of argument.
Thus, in particular, we see that generator matrices of MRD
codes can be used to construct linear extractors for restricted
affine sources that extract the entire source entropy with zero
error. This is possible provided that the field size is large
enough compared to the field size required to describe the
generator matrix of the affine source. Using Gabidulin’s rank
7 The argument still holds if the dimension of X is more than n− d+ 1.
8metric codes, we immediately obtain the following corollary
of Theorem 14:
Corollary 15. Let q be a prime power. Then for every positive
integer n, k ≤ n, and Q := qn, there is a linear function
f : FnQ → FkQ that is an explicit8 (k, 0)-extractor for Fq-
restricted affine sources over FQ.
V. INVERTING EXTRACTORS
In this section we will introduce the notion of invertible
extractors and its connection with wiretap protocols9. Later
we will use this connection to construct wiretap protocols with
good rate-resilience trade-offs.
Definition 16. Let Σ be a finite alphabet and f be a mapping
from Σn to Σm. For ν ≥ 0, a function A : Σm×{0, 1}r → Σn
is called a ν-inverter for f if the following conditions hold:
(a) (Inversion) Given x ∈ Σm such that f−1(x) is
nonempty, for every z ∈ {0, 1}r we have f(A(x, z)) =
x.
(b) (Uniformity) A(UΣm ,Ur) ∼ν UΣn .
A ν-inverter is called efficient if there is a randomized al-
gorithm that runs in worst case polynomial time and, given
x ∈ Σm and z as a random seed, computes A(x, z). We call a
mapping ν-invertible if it has an efficient ν-inverter, and drop
the prefix ν from the notation when it is zero.
The parameter r in the above definition captures the amount
of random bits that the inverter (seen as a randomized algo-
rithm) needs to receive. For our applications, no particular
care is needed to optimize this parameter and, as long as r is
polynomially bounded in n, it is generally ignored (the same
remark applies to the parameter r in Definition 4). In this work,
we are interested in randomness extractors that are invertible
functions (as in Definition 16). Such functions will be called
“invertible extractors”.
Remark 17. If a function f maps the uniform distribution to
a distribution that is -close to uniform (as is the case for all
extractors), then any randomized mapping that maps its input
x to a distribution that is ν¯-close to the uniform distribution
on f−1(x), for some ν¯ ≥ 0, is easily seen to be an ( + ν¯)-
inverter for f . In some situations designing such a function
might be easier than directly following the above definition.
Remark 18. A linear function f : Fnq → Fmq over a finite
field Fq is easily seen to be (perfectly) invertible10. To see
this, observe that the inverter is itself a linear function (of the
8We have implicitly assumed that an explicit respresentation of the finite
field Fq (i.e., a deterministic polynomial time algorithm for addition, multi-
plication, and encoding of the elements over Fq) is available. This is known
to be the case for all prime powers of small characteristic [26].
9 Another notion of invertible extractors was introduced in [27] and used in
[28] for a different application (entropic security) that should not be confused
with the one we use. Their notion applies to seeded extractors with long seeds
that are efficiently invertible bijections for every fixed seed. Such extractors
can be seen as a single-step walk on highly expanding graphs that mix in one
step. This is in a way similar to the multiple-step random walk used in the
seedless extractor of section VI, that can be regarded as a single-step walk
on the expander graph raised to a certain power.
10We have implicitly assumed that the field operations are efficiently
computable.
input and the random seed) that can be efficiently computed
using elementary methods from linear algebra11. In particular,
the linear extractors of Theorem 13 and Theorem 14 are both
invertible.
The idea of random pre-image sampling was proposed
in [12] for construction of adaptive AONTs from APRFs.
However, they ignored the efficiency of the inversion, as their
goal was to show the existence of (not necessarily efficient)
information-theoretically optimal adaptive AONTs. Moreover,
the strong notion of APRF and a perfectly uniform sampler
is necessary for their construction of AONTs. As wiretap
protocols are weaker than (worst-case) AONTs, they can be
constructed from slightly imperfect inverters as shown by the
following result.
Theorem 19. Let Σ be an alphabet of size d > 1 and
f : Σn → Σm be a (γ2/2)-invertible d-ary (k, ) symbol-
fixing extractor. Then, f and its inverter can be seen as a
decoder/encoder pair for an (n−k, +γ, γ)q-resilient wiretap
protocol with block length n and message length m.
Proof: Let E and D denote the wiretap encoder and
decoder, respectively. Hence, E is the (γ2/2)-inverter for f ,
and D is the extractor f itself. From the definition of the
inverter, for every x ∈ Σm and every random seed z, we have
D(E(x, z)) = x. Hence it is sufficient to show that the pair
satisfies the resiliency condition.
Let the random variable X be uniformly distributed on Σm
and the seed Z ∈ {0, 1}r be chosen uniformly at random.
Denote the encoding of X by Y := E(X,Z). Fix any S ⊆ [n]
of size at most n− k.
For every w ∈ Σ|S|, let Yw denote the set {y ∈ Σn : (y|S) =
w}. Note that the sets Yw partition the space Σn into |Σ||S|
disjoint sets.
Let Y and YS denote the distribution of Y and Y |S ,
respectively. The inverter guarantees that Y is (γ2/2)-close
to uniform. Applying Proposition 38 in the appendix, we get
that ∑
w∈Σ|S|
Pr[(Y |S) = w] · dist((Y|Yw),UYw) ≤ γ2.
The left hand side is the expectation of dist((Y|Yw),UYw).
Denote by W the set of all bad outcomes of Y |S , i.e.,
W := {w ∈ Σ|S| | dist((Y|Yw),UYw) > γ}.
By Markov’s inequality, we conclude that
Pr[(Y |S) ∈W ] ≤ γ.
For every w ∈ W , the distribution of Y conditioned on the
event (Y |S) = w is γ-close to a symbol-fixing source with
n − |S| ≥ k random symbols. The fact that D is a symbol-
fixing extractor for this entropy and Proposition 39 in the
appendix imply that, for the fixed choice of w, the distribution
11 More precisely, suppose that f(x) := A · x where x ∈ Fnq and A is an
m×n matrix of rank m. Add n−m rows to A to obtain an invertible n×n
matrix A¯. Then the inverse function will be given by f¯(y) := A¯−1 · (y, r),
where y ∈ Fmq is its input and r ∈ Fn−mq is chosen uniformly at random.
9of D(Y ) conditioned on the event (Y |S) = w is (γ + )-
close to uniform. Hence with probability at least 1 − γ the
distribution of X conditioned on the outcome of Y |S is (γ+)-
close to uniform. This ensures the resiliency of the protocol.
By combining Theorem 19, Theorem 13 using a Reed-
Solomon code, and Remark 18, we can obtain a perfectly
private, rate-optimal, wiretap protocol for the Wiretap II prob-
lem over large alphabets (of size n or larger). This recovers
the original result of Ozarow and Wyner12 [2]:
Corollary 20. For every positive integer n, prime power
q ≥ n, and δ ∈ [0, 1), there is a (δn, 0, 0)q-resilient wiretap
protocol with block length n and rate 1−δ that attains perfect
privacy.
VI. A WIRETAP PROTOCOL BASED ON RANDOM WALKS
In this section we describe a wiretap protocol that achieves
a rate R within a constant fraction of the information theo-
retically optimal value 1 − δ (the constant depending on the
alphabet size).
To achieve our result, we will modify the symbol-fixing
extractor of Kamp and Zuckerman [9], that is based on random
walks on expander graphs, to make it efficiently invertible
without affecting its extraction properties, and then apply
Theorem 19 above to obtain the desired wiretap protocol. In
the following sub-sections, we first review the preliminaries
on expander graphs that we will need, and then introduce the
construction and its analysis.
A. Preliminaries on Expander Graphs
For the wiretap protocol constructed in Section VI we need
essentially the same tools used for the symbol-fixing extractor
construction of [9], that we briefly review here. For a detailed
review of the theory of expander graphs, refer to the excellent
survey by Hoory, Linial and Wigderson [29], and books [30],
[31].
We will be working with directed regular expander graphs
that are obtained from undirected graphs by replacing each
undirected edge with two directed edges in opposite directions.
Let G = (V,E) be a d-regular graph. Then a labeling of the
edges of G is a function L : V × [d]→ V such that for every
u ∈ V and t ∈ [d], the edge (u, L(u, t)) is in E. The labeling
is consistent if whenever L(u, t) = L(v, t), then u = v. Note
that the natural labeling of a Cayley graph (cf. [29]) is in fact
consistent.
A family of d-regular graphs is an infinite set of d-regular
graphs such that for every N ∈ N, the set contains a graph
with at least N vertices. For a parameter c ≥ 1, we will
call a family c-dense if there is an N0 ∈ N such that, for
every N ≥ N0, the family has a graph with at least N and at
most cN vertices. We call a family of graphs constructible if
all the graphs in the family have a consistent labeling that is
efficiently computable. That is, there is a uniform, polynomial-
time algorithm that, given N ∈ N and i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [d],
12In fact, Ozarow and Wyner use a parity check matrix of an MDS code
in their construction, which is indeed a generator matrix for the dual code
which is itself MDS.
outputs the label of the jth neighbor of the ith vertex, under
a consistent labeling, in the graph in the family that has N
vertices (provided that it exists).
Let A denote the normalized adjacency matrix of a d-regular
graph G (that is, the adjacency matrix with all the entries
divided by d). We denote by λG the second largest eigenvalue
of A in absolute value. The spectral gap of G is given by
1−λG. Starting from a probability distribution p on the set of
vertices, represented as a real vector with coordinates index
by the vertex set, performing a single-step random walk on
G leads to the distribution defined by pA. The following is
a well known lemma on the convergence of the distributions
resulting from random walks (see [32] for a proof):
Lemma 21. Let G = (V,E) be a d-regular undirected graph,
and A be its normalized adjacency matrix. Then for any
probability vector p, we have ‖pA − UV ‖2 ≤ λG‖p − UV ‖2,
where ‖ · ‖2 denotes the `2 norm.
B. The construction and analysis
The extractor of Kamp and Zuckerman [9] starts with a
fixed vertex in a large expander graph and interprets the input
as the description of a walk on the graph. Then it outputs the
label of the vertex reached at the end of the walk. Notice that
a direct approach to invert this function amounts to sampling
a path of a particular length between a pair of vertices in the
graph, uniformly among all the possibilities, which might be
a difficult problem for good families of expander graphs13.
We work around this problem by choosing the starting point
of the walk from the input14. The price that we pay by
doing so is a slightly larger error compared to the original
construction of Kamp and Zuckerman that is, asymptotically,
of little significance. In particular we show the following:
Theorem 22. Let G be a constructible d-regular graph with
dm vertices and second largest eigenvalue λG ≥ 1/
√
d.
Then there exists an explicit invertible (k, 2s/2)d symbol-fixing
extractor SFExt : [d]n → [d]m, such that
s :=
{
m log d+ k log λ2G if k ≤ n−m,
(n− k) log d+ (n−m) log λ2G if k > n−m.
Proof: We first describe the extractor and its inverse.
Given an input (v, w) ∈ [d]m × [d]n−m, the function SFExt
interprets v as a vertex of G and w as the description of a
walk starting from v. The output is the index of the vertex
reached at the end of the walk. Fig. 3 depicts the procedure.
The 4-regular graph shown in this toy example has 8 vertices
labeled with binary sequences of length 3. Edges of the graph
are consistently labeled at both endpoints with the set of labels
{1, 2, 3, 4}. The input sequence (0, 1, 0 | 2, 3, 4, 2, 4) shown
below the graph describes a walk starting from the vertex 010
13In fact intractability of the easier problem of finding a loop in certain
families of expander graphs forms the underlying basis for a class of
cryptographic hash functions (cf. [33]). Even though this easier problem has
been solved in [34], uniform sampling of paths seems to be much more
difficult.
14 The idea of choosing the starting point of the walk from the input
sequence has been used before in extractor constructions [35], but in the
context of seeded extractors for general sources with high entropy.
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Fig. 3. The random-walk symbol-fixing extractor.
and following the path shown by the solid arrows. The output
of the extractor is the label of the final vertex 011.
The inverter Inv works as follows: Given an input x ∈ [d]m,
x is interpreted as a vertex of G. Then Inv picks W ∈ [d]n−m
uniformly at random. Let V be the unique vertex starting
from which the walk described by W ends up in x. The
inverter outputs (V,W ). It is easy to verify that Inv satisfies
the properties of a 0-inverter.
Now we show that SFExt is an extractor with the given
parameters. We will follow the same line of argument as in the
original proof of Kamp and Zuckerman. Let (v, w) ∈ [d]m ×
[d]n−m be a vector sampled from an (n, k)d symbol-fixing
source, and let u := SFExt(v, w). Recall that u can be seen
as the vertex of G reached at the end of the walk described
by w starting from v. Let pi denote the probability vector
corresponding to the walk right after the ith step, for i =
0, . . . , n−m, and denote by p the uniform probability vector
on the vertices of G. Our goal is to bound the error  of the
extractor, which is half the `1 norm of pn−m − p.
Suppose that v contains k1 random symbols and the re-
maining k2 := k− k1 random symbols are in w. Then p0 has
the value d−k1 at dk1 of the coordinates and zeros elsewhere,
hence
‖p0 − p‖22 = dk1(d−k1 − d−m)2 + (dm − dk1)d−2m
= d−k1 − d−m ≤ d−k1 .
Now for each i ∈ [n − m], if the ith step of the walk
corresponds to a random symbol in w the `2 distance is
multiplied by λG by Lemma 21. Otherwise the distance
remains the same due to the fact that the labeling of G
is consistent. Hence we obtain ‖pn−m − p‖22 ≤ d−k1λ2k2G .
Translating this into the `1 norm by using the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, we obtain , namely,
 ≤ 1
2
d(m−k1)/2λk2G < 2
((m−k1) log d+k2 log λ2G)/2.
By our assumption, λG ≥ 1/
√
d. Hence, everything but k1
and k2 being fixed, the above bound is maximized when k1
is minimized. When k ≤ n−m, this corresponds to the case
k1 = 0, and otherwise to the case k1 = k−n+m. This gives
us the desired upper bound on .
Combining this with Theorem 19 and setting up the the
right asymptotic parameters, we obtain our protocol for the
wiretap channel problem.
Corollary 23. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) be a constant, and suppose that
there is a constructible family of d-regular expander graphs
with spectral gap at least 1− λ that is c-dense, for constants
λ < 1 and c ≥ 1.
Then, for every large enough n, and arbitrarily small
constant ρ > 0, there is a (δn, 2−Ω(n), 0)d-resilient wiretap
protocol with block length n and rate
R =

1− δ/α− ρ if δ < α(1− ρ)/(1 + α),
α/(1 + α)− ρ if α(1−ρ)1+α ≤ δ < α1+α ,
α(1− δ)− ρ if δ ≥ α/(1 + α),
(1)
where α := − logd λ2.
Proof: For the case c = 1 we use Theorem 19 with the
extractor SFExt of Theorem 22 and its inverse. Every infinite
family of graphs must satisfy λ ≥ 2√d− 1/d [36], and in
particular we have λ ≥ 1/√d, as required by Theorem 22
(and α ≤ 1).
First, we exclude the “intermediate” interval α(1−ρ)/(1 +
α) ≤ δ < α/(1+α) by observing that we can always increase
δ (at the cost of a lower rate) so that its value falls outside
the interval. In particular, in this case, we can increase δ to
δ¯ := α/(1 +α) and apply the result proved later to get a rate
α(1−δ¯)−ρ = α/(1+α)−ρ. Note that the intermediate interval
can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a sufficiently small
value for ρ.
For the remaining values of δ, we choose the parameters
k := (1 − δ)n and m := nR, where the rate R is chosen
according to (1). The parameter s in Theorem 22 can be
rewritten as
s = min{m,n− k} log d− αmin{k, n−m} log d
= min{m, δn} log d− α(n−max{m, δn}) log d.
Now consider two cases:
1) δ < α(1− ρ)/(1 +α): In this case, we have R > δ and
thus, the value of s simplifies to
s = (δ − α+ αR)n log d
= (δ − α+ α(1− δ/α− ρ))n log d
= −αρn log d = −Ω(n).
2) δ ≥ α/(1+α): In this case, R ≤ δ, and s can be written
as
s = (R− α+ αδ)n log d
= (α(1− δ)− ρ− α+ αδ)n log d
= −ρn log d = −Ω(n).
Hence, we always have s = −Ω(n) and exponentially small
error. The case c > 1 is similar, but involves technicalities for
dealing with lack of graphs of arbitrary size in the family. We
will elaborate on this in Appendix C.
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Using explicit constructions of Ramanujan graphs that
achieve
λ ≤ 2√d− 1/d
when d− 1 is a prime power [37], [38], [39], one can obtain
α ≥ 1− 2/ log d, which can be made arbitrarily close to one
(hence, making the protocol arbitrarily close to the optimal
bound) by choosing a suitable alphabet size that does not
depend on n. Namely, we have the following result:
Corollary 24. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) and ρ > 0 be arbitrary constants.
Then, there is a positive integer d only depending on ρ such
that the following holds: For every large enough n, there is
a (δn, 2−Ω(n), 0)d-resilient wiretap protocol with block length
n and rate at least 1− δ − ρ.
VII. INVERTIBLE AFFINE EXTRACTORS AND
ASYMPTOTICALLY OPTIMAL WIRETAP PROTOCOLS
In this section we will construct a black box transformation
for making certain seedless extractors invertible. The method
is described in detail for affine extractors, and leads to wiretap
protocols with asymptotically optimal rate-resilience trade-
offs. Being based on affine extractors, these protocols are
only defined for prime power alphabet sizes. On the other
hand, the random-walk based protocol discussed in Section VI
can be potentially instantiated for an arbitrary alphabet size,
though achieving asymptotically sub-optimal parameters (and
a positive rate only for an alphabet of size 3 or more).
Modulo some minor differences, the construction can be
simply described as follows: A seedless affine extractor is first
used to extract a small number of uniform random bits from
the source, and the resulting sequence is then used as the seed
for a seeded extractor that extracts almost the entire entropy
of the source.
Of course, seeded extractors in general are not guaranteed
to work if (as in the above construction) their seed is not in-
dependent from the source. However, as observed by Gabizon
and Raz [20], a linear seeded extractor can extract from an
affine source if the seed is the outcome of an affine extractor
on the source. This idea was formalized in a more general
setting by Shaltiel [40].
Shaltiel’s result gives a general framework for transforming
any seedless extractor (for a family of sources satisfying a
certain closedness condition) with short output length to one
with an almost optimal output length. The construction uses
the imperfect seedless extractor to extract a small number of
uniform random bits from the source, and will then use the
resulting sequence as the seed for a seeded extractor to extract
more random bits from the source. For a suitable choice of
the seeded extractor, one can use this construction to extract
almost all min-entropy of the source.
The closedness condition needed for this result to work for
a family C of sources is that, letting f(x, z) denote the seeded
extractor with seed z, for every X ∈ C and every fixed z and
y, the distribution (X|f(X , z) = y) belongs to C. If f is a
linear function for every fixed s, the result will be available
for affine sources (since we are imposing a linear constraint on
an affine source, it remains an affine source). A more precise
statement of Shaltiel’s main result is the following:
Theorem 25. [40] Let C be a class of distributions on {0, 1}n
and f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}t be an extractor for C with error .
Let F : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}t → {0, 1}m be a function for which C
satisfies the closedness condition above. Then for every X ∈ C,
F (X , f(X )) ∼·2t+3 F (X ,Ut).
A seeded extractor is called linear if it is a linear function
for every fixed choice of the seed. This condition is in particu-
lar satisfied by Trevisan’s extractor [41]. For our construction,
we will use the following improvement of this extractor due
to Raz, Reingold and Vadhan [42]:
Theorem 26. [42] There is an explicit strong linear seeded
(k, )-extractor Ext : Fn2 × {0, 1}r → Fm2 with r =
O(log3(n/)) and m = k −O(r).
Remark 27. We note that our arguments would identically
work for any other linear seeded extractor as well, for instance
those constructed in [43], [44]. However, the most crucial
parameter in our application is the output length of the
extractor, being closely related to the rate of the wiretap
protocols we obtain. Among the constructions we are aware
of, the result quoted in Theorem 26 is the best in this regard.
Moreover, an affine seeded extractor with better parameters is
constructed by Gabizon and Raz [20], but it requires a large
alphabet size to work.
Now, having the right tools in hand, we are ready to formally
describe our construction of invertible affine extractors with
nearly optimal output length. Broadly speaking, the construc-
tion follows the abovementioned idea of Shaltiel, Gabizon,
and Raz [40], [20] on enlarging the output length of affine
extractors, with an additional “twist” for making the extractor
invertible. For concreteness, the description is given over the
binary field F2:
Theorem 28. For every constant δ ∈ (0, 1] and every
α ∈ (0, 1), there is an explicit 0-invertible affine extractor
f : Fn2 → Fm2 for min-entropy δn with output length m =
δn−O(nα) and error  = O(2−nα/3).
Proof: Let  := 2−n
α/3
, and t := O(log3(n/)) = O(nα)
be the seed length required by the extractor Ext in Theorem 26
for input length n and error , and further, let n′ := n −
t. Set up Ext for input length n′, min-entropy δn − t, seed
length t and error . Also set up Bourgain’s extractor AExt
(Theorem 12) for input length n′ and entropy rate δ′, for an
arbitrary constant δ′ < δ. Then the function f will view the
n-bit input sequence as a tuple (s, x), s ∈ Ft2 and x ∈ Fn
′
2 ,
and outputs Ext(x, s+AExt(x)|[t]). This is depicted in Fig. 4.
First we show that the construction gives an affine extractor.
Suppose that (S,X) ∈ Ft2×Fn
′
2 is a random variable sampled
from an affine distribution with min-entropy δn. The variable
S can have an affine dependency on X . Hence, for every fixed
s ∈ Ft2, the distribution of X conditioned on the event S = s
is affine with min-entropy at least δn−t, which is at least δ′n′
for large enough n. Hence AExt(X) will be 2−Ω(n)-close to
uniform by Theorem 12. This implies that AExt(X)|[t]+S can
extract t random bits from the affine source with error 2−Ω(n).
Combining this with Theorem 25, and noticing the fact that
the class of affine extractors is closed with respect to linear
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Fig. 4. Construction of the invertible affine extractor.
seeded extractors, we conclude that f is an affine extractor
with error at most + 2−Ω(n) · 2t+3 = O(2−nα/3).
Now the inverter works as follows: Given y ∈ Fm2 , first it
picks Z ∈ Ft2 uniformly at random. The seeded extractor Ext,
given the seed Z is a linear function ExtZ : Fn
′
2 → Fm2 . With-
out loss of generality, assume that this function is surjective15.
Then the inverter picks X ∈ Fn′2 uniformly at random from the
affine subspace defined by the linear constraint ExtZ(X) = y,
and outputs (Z+AExt(X)|[t], X). It is easy to verify that the
output is indeed a valid preimage of y. To see the uniformity
of the inverter, note that if y is chosen uniformly at random,
the distribution of (Z,X) will be uniform on Fn2 . Hence
(Z+AExt(X)|[t], X), which is the output of the inverter, will
be uniform.
In the above construction we are using an affine and a
linear seeded extractor as black boxes, and hence, they can
be replaced by any other extractors as well (the construction
will achieve an optimal rate provided that the seeded extractor
extracts almost the entire source entropy). In particular, over
large fields one can use the affine and seeded extractors given
by Gabizon and Raz [20] that work for sub-constant entropy
rates as well.
Moreover, for concreteness we described and instantiated
15Because the seeded extractor is strong and linear, for most choices of the
seed it is a good extractor (by an averaging argument), and hence necessarily
surjective (if not, one of the output symbols would linearly depend on the
others and obviously the output distribution would not be close to uniform).
Hence if Ext is not surjective for some seed z, one can replace it by a trivial
surjective linear mapping without affecting its extraction properties.
our construction over the binary field. Observe that Shaltiel’s
result, for the special case of affine sources, holds regardless of
the alphabet size. Moreover, Trevisan’s linear seeded extractor
can be naturally extended to handle arbitrary alphabets. Hence,
in order to extend our result to non-binary alphabets, it
suffices to ensure that a suitable seedless affine extractor that
supports the desired alphabet size is available. Bourgain’s
original result [21] is stated and proved for the binary alphabet;
however, this result can be adapted to work for larger fields as
well [45]. Such an extension (along with some improvements
and simplifications) is made explicit by Yehudayoff [22].
An affine extractor is in particular, a symbol-fixing extractor.
Hence Theorem 28, combined with Theorem 19 gives us a
wiretap protocol with almost optimal parameters:
Theorem 29. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1/3) be constants.
Then for a prime power q > 1 and every large enough n
there is a (δn,O(2−n
α
), 0)q-resilient wiretap protocol with
block length n and rate 1− δ − o(1).
VIII. FURTHER APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
In this section we will sketch some important applications
of our technique to more general wiretap problems.
A. Noisy Channels and Active Intruders
Suppose that Alice wants to transmit a particular sequence
to Bob through a noisy channel. She can use various tech-
niques from coding theory to encode her information and
protect it against noise. Now what if there is an intruder
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who can partially observe the transmitted sequence and even
manipulate it? Modification of the sequence by the intruder can
be regarded in the same way as the channel noise; thus one gets
security against active intrusion as a “bonus” by constructing a
code that is resilient against noise and passive eavesdropping.
There are two natural and modular approaches to construct
such a code.
A possible attempt would be to first encode the message
using a good error-correcting code and then to apply a wiretap
encoder to protect the encoded sequence against the wiretap-
per. However, this will not necessarily keep the information
protected against the channel noise, as the combination of the
wiretap encoder and decoder does not have to be resistant to
noise.
Another attempt is to first use a wiretap encoder and then
apply an error-correcting code on the resulting sequence. Here
it is not necessarily the case that the information will be kept
secure against intrusion anymore, as the wiretapper now gets
to observe the bits from the channel-encoded sequence that
may reveal information about the original sequence. However,
the wiretap protocol given in Theorem 29 is constructed from
an invertible affine extractor, and guarantees resiliency even if
the intruder is allowed to observe arbitrary linear combinations
of the transmitted sequence (in this case, the distribution of
the encoded sequence subject to the intruder’s observation
becomes an affine source and thus, the arguments of the proof
of Theorem 19 remain valid). In particular, Theorem 29 holds
even if the intruder’s observation is allowed to be obtained
after applying any arbitrary linear mapping on the output of
the wiretap encoder. Hence, we can use the wiretap scheme as
an outer code and still ensure privacy against an active intruder
and reliability in presence of a noisy channel, provided that
the error-correcting code being used as the inner code is linear.
This immediately gives us the following result:
Theorem 30. Suppose that there is a q-ary linear error-
correcting code with rate R that is able to correct up to a
τ fraction of errors (via unique or list decoding). Then for
every constant δ ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1/3) and large enough
n, there is a (δn,O(2−n
α
), 0)q-resilient wiretap protocol with
block length n and rate R− δ− o(1) that can also correct up
to a τ fraction of errors.
Proof: We use the wiretap code given by Theorem 29
as the outer code and the linear channel code with rate R
as the inner code. Suppose that the rate of the outer code is
R′ and the block length of the combined code is n. By the
discussion above and using Theorem 29, the combined code
tolerates against Rn(1−R′− o(1)) bits of observation by the
intruder, even after linear post-processings of the inner code.
Therefore the resilience of the combined code can be written
as
δ = R(1−R′ − o(1)),
from which we can compute the rate of the combined code as
RR′ = R− δ − o(1).
The setting discussed above is shown in Fig. 5. The same
idea can be used to protect fountain codes, e.g., LT- [46] and
Raptor Codes [47], against wiretappers without affecting the
error correction capabilities of the code.
Obviously this simple composition idea can be used for
any type of channel so long as the inner code is linear, at
the cost of reducing the total rate by almost δ (following
exactly the same argument as in Theorem 30). Hence, if the
inner code achieves the Shannon capacity of the direct channel
(in the absence of the wiretapper), the composed code will
have a rate that is smaller than the direct channel capacity
by the resilience parameter δ. This is known to be the best
possible rate when the channels are discrete, memoryless, and
symmetric and the wiretap channel is a degraded version of
the symmetric channel [48], [49].
B. Network Coding
Our wiretap protocol from invertible affine extractors is also
applicable in the more general setting of transmission over
networks. In this work we focus on a network setting known as
multicast. A multicast communication network can be modeled
as a directed graph, in which nodes represent the network
devices and information is transmitted along the edges. One
particular node is identified as the source and m nodes are
identified as receivers. The main problem in network coding is
to have the source reliably transmit information to the receivers
at the highest possible rate, while allowing the intermediate
nodes arbitrarily process the information along the way.
Suppose that, in the graph that defines the topology of the
network, the min-cut between the source to each receiver is n.
It was shown in [50] that the source can transmit information
up to rate n (symbols per transmission) to all receivers (which
is optimal), and in [51], [52] that linear network coding is in
fact sufficient to achieve this rate. That is, the transmission at
rate n is possible when the intermediate nodes are allowed to
forward packets that are (as symbols over a finite field) linear
combinations of the packets that they receive (See [53] for a
comprehensive account of these and other relevant results).
A basic example is shown by the butterfly network in Fig. 6.
This network consists of a source on the top and two receivers
on the bottom, where the min-cut to each receiver is 2. Without
processing the incoming data, as in the left figure, one of the
two receivers may receive information at the optimal rate of 2
symbols per transmission (namely, receiver 1 in the figure).
However, due to the bottleneck existing in the middle (shown
by the thick edge a → b), the other receiver will be forced
to receive at an inferior rate of 1 symbol per transmission.
However, if linear processing of the information is allowed,
node a may combine its incoming information by treating
packets as symbols over a finite field and adding them up,
as in the right figure. Both receivers may then solve a full-
rank system of linear equations to retrieve the original source
symbols x1 and x2, and thereby achieve the optimal min-cut
rate.
Designing wiretap protocols for networks is an important
question in network coding, which was first posed by Cai and
Yeung [11]. In this problem, an intruder can choose a bounded
14
Linear
Channel Encoder
X = (X1, . . . , Xm)
Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn)
Direct 
Channel
message
redundant encoding receiver’s sequence
Yˆ = (Yˆ1, . . . , Yˆn)
Channel 
Decoder
estimate
Xˆ = (Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆm)randomness
intruder’s
sequence
(W1, . . . ,Wt).
Arbitrary Linear 
Transformation
Wiretap
Encoder
Wiretap
Decoder
active intrusion
Fig. 5. Wiretap scheme composed with channel coding. If the wiretap scheme is constructed by an invertible affine extractor, it can guarantee secrecy even
in presence of arbitrary linear manipulation of the information. Active intrusion can be defied using an error-correcting inner code.
a
b
source
receiver 1 receiver 2
x1
x1
x1
x2
x2x2
x2x2
a
b
source
receiver 1 receiver 2
x1
x1
x1
x2
x2x1 + x2
x1 + x2 x1 + x2
x2 x2
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number, say t, of the edges and eavesdrop all the packets
going through those edges. They designed a network code
that could provide the optimal multicast rate of n − t with
perfect privacy. However this code requires an alphabet size
of order
(|E|
t
)
, where E is the set of edges. Their result was
later improved in [54] who showed that a random linear coding
scheme can provide privacy with a much smaller alphabet size
if one is willing to achieve a slightly sub-optimal rate. Namely,
they obtain rate n− t(1 + ) with an alphabet of size roughly
Θ(|E|1/), and show that achieving the exact optimal rate is
not possible with small alphabet size.
El Rouayheb and Soljanin [55] suggested to use the original
code of Ozarow and Wyner [2] as an outer code at the source
and showed that a careful choice of the network code can
provide optimal rate with perfect privacy. However, their code
eventually needs an alphabet of size at least
(|E|−1
t−1
)
+ m.
Building upon this work, Silva and Kschischang [8] con-
structed an outer code that provides similar results while
leaving the underlying network code unchanged. However,
their result comes at the cost of increasing the packet size by
a multiplicative factor of at least the min-cut bound, n (or in
mathematical terms, the original alphabet size q of the network
is enlarged to at least qn). For practical purposes, this is an
acceptable solution provided that an estimate on the min-cut
size of the network is available at the wiretap encoder.
By the discussion presented in Section VIII-A, the rate-
optimal wiretap protocol given in Theorem 29 stays resilient
even in presence of any linear post-processing of the encoded
information. Thus, using the wiretap encoder given by this
result as an outer-code in the source node, one can construct
an asymptotically optimal wiretap protocol for networks that
is completely unaware of the network and eliminates all the
restrictions in the above results. This is schematically shown
in Fig. 7. Hence, extending our notion of (t, , γ)q-resilient
wiretap protocols naturally to communication networks, we
obtain the following:
Theorem 31. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1/3) be constants,
and consider a network that uses a linear coding scheme over
a finite field Fq for reliably transmitting information at rate R.
Suppose that, at each transmission, an intruder can arbitrarily
observe up to δR intermediate links in the network. Then the
source and the receiver nodes can use an outer code of rate
1 − δ − o(1) (obtaining a total rate of R(1 − δ) − o(1))
which is completely independent of the network, leaves the
network code unchanged, and provides almost perfect privacy
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Fig. 7. Linear network coding with an outer layer of wiretap encoding added
for providing secrecy.
with error O(2−R
α
) and zero leakage over a q-ary alphabet.
In addition to the above result that uses the invertible affine
extractor of Theorem 28, it is possible to use other rate-
optimal invertiable affine extractors. In particular, observe that
the restricted affine extractor of Theorem 14 (and in particular,
Corollary 15) is a linear function (over the extension field) and
is thus, obviously has an efficient 0-inverter (since inverting the
extractor amounts to solving a system of linear equations). By
using this extractor (instantiated with Gabidulin’s MRD codes
as in Corollary 15), we may recover the result of Silva and
Kschischang [8] in our framework. More precisely, we have
the following result:
Corollary 32. Let q be any prime power, and consider a
network with minimum cut of size n that uses a linear coding
scheme over Fq for reliably transmitting information at rate R.
Suppose that, at each transmission, an intruder can arbitrarily
observe up to δR intermediate links in the network, for some
δ ∈ [0, 1). Then the source and the receiver nodes can use an
outer code of rate 1 − δ over Fqn (obtaining a total rate of
R(1−δ)) that provides perfect privacy over a qn-ary alphabet.
C. Arbitrary Processing
In this section we consider the erasure wiretap problem in
its most general setting, which is still of practical importance.
Suppose that the information emitted by the source goes
through an arbitrary communication medium and is arbitrarily
processed on the way to provide protection against noise, to
obtain better throughput, or for other reasons. Now consider
an intruder who is able to eavesdrop a bounded amount
of information at various points of the channel. One can
model this scenario in the same way as the original point-to-
Source
Receiver
Side Channel 
(Limited Bandwidth)
Wiretap Encoder
Wiretap Decoder
Fig. 8. The wiretap channel problem in presence of arbitrary intermediate
processing. In this example, data is transmitted over a packet network (shown
as a cloud) in which some intermediate links (showed by the dashed arrows),
as well as the side channel (also dashed), are accessible to an intruder.
point wiretap channel problem (depicted in Fig. 1), with the
difference that instead of observing t arbitrarily chosen bits,
the intruder now gets to choose an arbitrary Boolean circuit C
with t output bits (which captures the accumulation of all the
intermediate processing) and observes the output of the circuit
when applied to the transmitted sequence16.
Obviously there is no way to guarantee resiliency in this
setting, since the intruder can simply choose C to compute t
output bits of the wiretap decoder. However, suppose that in
addition there is an auxiliary communication channel between
the source and the receiver (that we call the side channel) that
is separated from the main channel, and hence, the information
passed through the two channel do not blend together by the
intermediate processing.
We call this scenario, shown in Fig. 8, the general wiretap
problem and extend our notion of (t, , γ)-resilient protocol
to this problem. The slight modification in the generalized
notion is that now the output of the encoder (and the input of
the decoder) is a pair of strings (Y1, Y2) ∈ {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n′ ,
where Y1 (resp., Y2) is sent through the main (resp., side)
channel. Now we call n + n′ the block length and let the
intruder choose an arbitrary Boolean function C : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}t, and observe (C(Y1), Y2).
More precisely, the generalized model that we consider can
be described as follows:
1) A wiretap encoder E(X,Z) encodes a message X ∈
{0, 1}m using a uniformly random seed Z. The output
of the encoder is a pair of strings (Y1, Y2).
2) The encoded strings Y1 and Y2 are sent through the main
channel and the side channel, respectively.
3) The intruder chooses an arbitrary function C : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}t, and observes (C(Y1), Y2).
16 In fact this models a “harder” problem, as in our problem the circuit C
is given by the communication scheme and not the intruder. Nevertheless, we
consider the harder problem.
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4) A wiretap decoder D(Y1, Y2) receives the encoded
strings (Y1, Y2) and reconstructs the message X .
For a pair of strings (w1, w2) ∈ {0, 1}t × {0, 1}n′ , denote
by X(w1,w2) the distribution of the message X conditioned on
the event (C(Y1), Y2) = (w1, w2). Now we call a generalized
wiretap encoder/decoder pair (t, , γ)-resilient if, for every
choice of the function C chosen by the intruder, the following
holds. Similar to Definition 4, denote by BC the set of bad
observations
BC := {(w1, w2) ∈ {0, 1}t×{0, 1}n′ : dist(X,X(w1,w2)) > }.
Then the wiretap protocol must satisfy
Pr[(C(Y1), Y2) ∈ BC ] ≤ γ.
The parameters  and γ are again called the error and the
leakage of the protocol. The rate and resilience parameters are
now given by R := m/(n+ n′) and δ := t/n, respectively.
The standard definition of wiretap protocols (Definition 4)
corrsponds to the case when C(Y1) = Y1|S , for some S ⊆ [n],
and Y2 is the empty string. Since the information in Y2,
transmitted through the side channel, does not affect the
resilience parameter and only lowers the rate, we see that the
information-theoretic upper bound for the achievable rates in
the original wiretap problem (namely, R ≤ 1 − δ + o(1))
extends to the generalized wiretap problem as well. Below we
show that for the generalized problem, secure transmission
is indeed possible at asymptotically optimal rates (that is,
R ≥ 1− δ − o(1)).
As before, our idea is to use invertible extractors to construct
general wiretap protocols, but this time we use invertible
strong seeded extractors. Strong seeded extractors were used
in [10] to construct ERFs, and this is exactly what we use as
the decoder in our protocol. As the encoder we will use the
corresponding inverter, which outputs a pair of strings, one for
the extractor’s input which is sent through the main channel
and another as the seed which is sent through the side channel.
Hence we will obtain the following result:
Theorem 33. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) be a constant. Then for every
α,  > 0, there is a (δn, , 2−αn+)-resilient wiretap protocol
for the general wiretap channel problem that sends n bits
through the main channel and n′ = O(log3(n/2)) bits
through the side channel and achieves rate 1 − δ − α −
O(n′/(n + n′)). The protocol is secure even when the entire
communication through the side channel is observable by the
intruder.
Proof: We will need the following claim in our proof,
which is easy to verify using an averaging argument:
Claim. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}δn be any Boolean function.
Then for every α > 0, and X ∼ Un, the probability that f(X)
has fewer than 2n(1−δ−α) preimages is at most 2−αn.
Proof of Claim: Define
B := {y ∈ {0, 1}m : |f−1(y)| < 2n(1−δ−α)}.
Thus, the probability that we wish to bound is
Pr
X
[f(X) ∈ B] = 2−n
∑
y∈B
|f−1(y)|
< 2−n
∑
y∈B
|f−1(y)|2n(1−δ−α) < 2−α,
where the last inequality is from the trivial bound |B| ≤ 2δn.
Now, let Ext be the linear seeded extractor of Theorem 26,
set up for input length n, seed length n′ = O(log3(n/2)),
min-entropy n(1− δ−α), output length m = n(1− δ−α)−
O(n′), and error 2. Then the encoder chooses a seed Z for
the extractor uniformly at random and sends it through the
side channel.
For the chosen value of Z, the extractor is a linear function,
and as before, given a message X ∈ {0, 1}m, the encoder
picks a random vector Y in the affine subspace that is
mapped by this linear function to X and sends it through the
public channel. By Remark 18, the encoder is polynomial-time
computable and Y is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}n.
The decoder, upon receiving (Y,Z), applies the extractor to
the seed Z received through the side channel and the trans-
mitted string Y . This obviously reproduces the sent message
X = Ext(Y,Z). The resiliency of the protocol can be shown
in a similar manner as in Theorem 19, as follows. Suppose that
the intruder observes the seed Z and W := C(Y ) ∈ {0, 1}δn,
for an arbitrary function C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}δn.
First, note that by the above claim, with probability at least
1− 2−αn, the string Y transmitted through the main channel,
conditioned on the observation W of the intruder from the
main channel, has a distribution Y with min-entropy at least
n(1 − δ − α). Call a particular realization w ∈ {0, 1}δn of
the observation outcome W good if it makes Y satisfies this
property. In the sequel, we condition the random variable W
to a good outcome w.
Now suppose that the seed Z is entirely revealed to the
intruder, and let z ∈ {0, 1}n′ denote the particular realization
of Z. By an averaging argument, with probability at least 1−,
Z is a good seed for Y , in the sense that Ext(Y, z) is -close
to uniform.
Therefore, conditioned on the event that both parts of the
observation outcome (w, z) are good, the message distribution
conditioned on the intruder’s observation (which is given by
Ext(Y, z)) is -close to uniform. The leakage parameter is
given by the probability that either the part of the observa-
tion outcome corresponding to the main channel or the part
corresponding to the side channel is not good. By a union
bound this probability is upper bounded by 2−αn + , which
completes the proof of resiliency.
We observe that it is not possible to guarantee zero leakage
for the general wiretap problem above. As an extreme case,
suppose that the function C is chosen in a way that it has a
single preimage for a particular output w (i.e., |C−1(w)| =
1). With nonzero probability the observation of the intruder
from the main channel may turn out to be w, in which case
the entire message is revealed (since the intruder learns the
entire communication (Y1, Y2) in this case). Nevertheless, it is
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possible to guarantee negligible leakage as the above theorem
does.
Finally, we remark that the general protocol above can
be used for the original wiretap II problem (where there
is no intermediate processing involved). In this case, both
encoded strings Y1 and Y2 are sent through the main channel
(since in the original problem there is no side channel).
But fortunately, since the intruder’s function C is a simple
projection (in particular, C(Y1) = Y1|S for a small set of the
coordinate positions S ⊆ [n]), sending both Y1 and Y2 through
the same channel for this special case does not affect the
secrecy guarantees of the generalized wiretap model. Contrary
to Theorem 29 however, we cannot guarantee zero leakage
when we use a generalized wiretap protocol for the original
wiretap II model.
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APPENDIX
A. Review of the Related Notions in Cryptography
In this appendix we review notions in cryptography that
are relevant to our wiretap protocol model introduced in
Section III. These notions include resilient functions (RF) and
almost perfect resilient functions (APRF), exposure-resilient
functions (ERF), and all-or-nothing transforms (AONT).
The notion of resilient functions was introduced in [56]
(and also [57] as the bit-extraction problem). A deterministic
polynomial-time computable function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
is called t-resilient if whenever any t bits of the its input are
arbitrarily chosen by an adversary and the rest of the bits are
chosen uniformly at random, then the output distribution of the
function is (close to) uniform. APRF is a stronger variation
where the criterion for uniformity of the output distribution
is defined with respect to the `∞ (i.e., point-wise distance of
distributions) rather than `1. This stronger requirement allows
for an “adaptive security” of APRFs.
ERFs, introduced in [10], are similar to resilient functions
except that the entire input is chosen uniformly at random,
and the view of the adversary from the output remains (close
to) uniform even after observing any t input bits of his
choice. More formally, a polynomial-time computable function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a t-ERF if for a uniform random
variable Y on Fn2 and all S ⊆ [n] such that |S| ≤ t, the
two distributions (Y |S , f(Y )) and (Y |S ,Um) are close in
statistical distance. As such, ERFs are slightly weaker than
resilient functions since their output is fully random subject
to a random fixing of positions in S, as opposed to all possible
fixings. A variation of ERF called adaptive ERF allows the
adversary to make up to t adaptive queries to the input; i.e.,
the choice of each query position may depend on the outcome
of the previous ones. Adaptive ERFs turn out to be much more
challenging to construct than ERFs.
ERFs and resilient functions are known to be useful in
a scenario similar to the wiretap channel problem. Suppose
that Alice and Bob want to agree on any random string (for
example to use as a session key) and that their communication
channel is wiretapped. In this case Alice can send a random
string Y ∈ {0, 1}n to Bob and then the two parties agree on
X := f(Y ), where f is a t-ERF or a t-resilient function. It
follows that an intruder who observes any t positions of Y
does not learn much about the agreed string X . The main
difference between this setting and the model we introduced
in Definition 4 is that the two parties only care about the fact
that X is uniformly random, and not its actual realization. That
is, we have a secure agreement problem rather than a secure
communication problem.
Another closely related notion is that of all-or-nothing
transforms, which was suggested in [15] for protection of
block ciphers. This notion is defined as follows.
Definition 34. A randomized polynomial-time computable
function f : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n, (m ≤ n, r =
poly(n)), where the first argument is the function’s input and
the second one is a random seed, is called a (statistical, non-
adaptive, and secret-only) t-AONT with error  if
1) It is efficiently invertible. That is, there is a deterministic
polynomial time algorithm A such that for every x ∈
{0, 1}m, we have PrZ∼Ur [A(f(x, Z)) = x] = 1.
2) For every S ⊆ [n] such that |S| ≤ t, and all x1, x2 ∈
{0, 1}m we have that the two distributions f(x1,Ur)|S
and f(x2,Ur)|S are -close.
An AONT with  = 0 is called perfect. It is easy to see that
perfectly private wiretap protocols are equivalent to perfect
adaptive AONTs. It was shown in [12] that such functions
can not exist (with positive, constant rate) when the adversary
is allowed to observe more than half of the encoded bits (so
this is a too strong notion for the wiretap channel problem).
A similar negative result was obtained in [13] for the case of
perfect linear RFs.
As pointed out in [12], AONTs can be used in the original
scenario of Ozarow and Wyner’s wiretap channel problem.
However, the best known constructions of AONTs (over small
alphabets) can achieve rate-resilience trade-offs that are far
from the information-theoretic optimum (see Figure 2). More-
over it is straightforward to see that, in the perfectly private
wiretap coding scheme of Ozarow and Wyner [2], the encoder
can be seen as an adaptively secure, perfect AONTs and the
decoder is in fact an adaptive perfect RF.
While an AONT requires indistinguishability of intruder’s
view for every fixed pair (x1, x2) of messages, the relaxed
notion of average-case AONT requires the expected distance
of f(x1,Ur)|S and f(x2,Ur)|S to be at most  for a uniform
random message pair. That is, for average-case AONTs, the
second condition in Definition 34 is relaxed to
EX1,X2∼Um [dist(f(X1,Ur)|S , f(X2,Ur)|S ] ≤ .
Hence, for a negligible , the distance will be negligible for all
but a negligible fraction of message pairs. Here we show that,
up to a loss in parameters, wiretap protocols are equivalent to
average case AONTs:
Lemma 35. Let (E,D) be an encoding/decoding pair for a
(t, , γ)2-resilient wiretap protocol. Then E is an average-case
t-AONT with error at most 2(+ γ).
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Conversely, an average-case t-AONT with error η4 (for
some small η < 1/2) can be used as a (t, 2η, 2η)-resilient
wiretap encoder.
Proof: Consider a (t, , γ)2-resilient wiretap protocol as
in Definition 4, and accordingly, let the random variable Y =
E(X,Z) denote the encoding of X with a random seed Z.
For a set S ⊆ [n] of size at most t, denote by W := Y |S the
intruder’s observation.
The resiliency condition implies that, the set of bad obser-
vations BS has a probability mass of at most γ and hence, the
expected distance dist(X|W,X) taken over the distribution
of W is at most  + γ. Now we can apply Proposition 37
in the appendix to the jointly distributed pair of random
variables (W,X), and conclude that the expected distance
dist(W |X,W ) over the distribution of X (which is uniform) is
at most +γ. This implies that the encoder is an average-case
t-AONT with error at most 2(+ γ).
For the converse, we define the wiretap encoder E and
decoder D by the AONT and its inverse, respectively. From
the definition of AONTs, it is immediately clear that the
decodability condition of Definition 4 is satisfied. In order
to show the resiliency, fix any subset S ⊆ [n] of size t and
assume that the intruder observes W := Y |S , where Y is the
encoding of a random message X ∈ {0, 1}m. Denote by W
the distribution of W on {0, 1}t, and for every x ∈ {0, 1}m,
byWx the distribution of W conditioned on the event X = x.
Now, the definition of t-AONT implies that for a random pair
X1, X2 ∼ Um, we have
EX1,X2dist(WX1 ,WX2) ≤ η4.
Fix any xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m for which we have
EXdist(Wxˆ,WX) ≤ η4.
By averaging, we know that such an xˆ exists. By another
averaging argument (using Markov’s inequality), there is a
subset G ⊆ {0, 1}m of size at least (1 − η2)2m such that
for every x ∈ G, we have dist(Wxˆ,Wx) ≤ η2. Therefore, for
each x ∈ G, the distribution Wx (now seen as a vector of
probabilities over {0, 1}t), can be written as Wx =Wxˆ + Ex,
where by the definition of statistical distance, the `1 norm
‖Ex‖1 is at most 2η2. On the other hand, we can write down
the convex combination
W = 2−m
∑
x∈{0,1}m
Wx
= 2−m
∑
x∈G
Wx + 2−m
∑
x∈{0,1}m\G
Wx
= 2−m
∑
x∈G
Wx + E ,
where we have defined E := 2−m∑x∈{0,1}m\GWx, and know
that ‖E‖1 ≤ η2. Substituting for Wx, we get
W = 2−m
∑
x∈G
(Wxˆ + Ex) + E
= 2−m|G|Wxˆ + E ′,
where E ′ := 2−m∑x∈G Ex+E . By the bounds on the `1 norm
on the Ex, we know that ‖E ′‖1 ≤ 3η2, which implies
‖W − 2−m|G|Wxˆ‖1 ≤ 3η2. (2)
Now, since 2−m|G| ≥ 1− η2, we have
‖W −Wxˆ‖1 ≤ ‖W − 2−m|G|Wxˆ‖1 + η2 ≤ 4η2,
where the second inequality is from (2). So, the distributions
W andWxˆ are (2η2)-close. Now we can apply Proposition 37
for the joint distribution of the variables (X,W ), and deduce
EW [dist(X|W,Um)] = EX [dist(WX ,W)]. (3)
Here we have used the notation X|W for the distribution of
the random variable X conditioned on the observation W . We
know that for every x ∈ G,
dist(Wx,W) ≤ dist(Wx,Wxˆ) + 2η2 ≤ 3η2.
Thus,
EX [dist(WX ,W)] ≤ |{0, 1}m \ G|2−m + 3η2 ≤ 4η2.
Combined with (3), we get
EW [dist(X|W,Um)] ≤ 4η2.
Now we are ready to apply Markov’s inequality again to
conclude that
Pr[dist(X|W,Um) > 2η] ≤ 2η,
which proves the resiliency condition.
It is important to note that the converse direction does
not guarantee zero leakage, and hence, zero leakage wiretap
protocols are in general stronger than average-case AONTs.
An average-case to worst-case reduction for AONTs was
shown in [10] which, combined with the above lemma, can
be used to show that any wiretap protocol can be used to
construct an AONT (at the cost of a rate loss).
A simple universal transformation was proposed in [10]
to obtain an AONT from any ERF, by one-time padding
the message with a random string obtained from the ERF.
In particular, given an ERF f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, the
AONT g : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m+n is defined as
g(x) := (z, x + f(z)). In other words, the ERF is used to
one-time pad the message with a random secret string. As
proved in in [10], the function g constructed in this way is
indeed an AONT.
This construction can also yield a wiretap protocol with zero
leakage (this is easy to see by following the proof of [10]
for the above construction). However, it has the drawback of
significantly weakening the rate-resilience trade-off. Namely,
even if an information theoretically optimal ERF is used in
this reduction, the resulting wiretap protocol will only achieve
half the optimal rate (see Fig. 2). This is because the one-
time padding strategy necessarily requires a random seed
that is at least as long as the message itself, even if the
intruder is restricted to observe only a small fraction of the
transmitted sequence. Hence the rate of the resulting AONT
cannot exceed 1/2, and it is not clear how to improve this
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universal transformation to obtain a worst-case AONT using
a shorter seed.
For applications in cryptography, e.g., the context of ERFs
or AONTs, it is typically assumed that the adversary learns
all but a small number of the bits in the encoded sequence,
and the incurred blow-up in the encoding is not as crucially
important, as long as it remains within a reasonable range.
On the other hand, as in this work we are motivated by the
wiretap channel problem which is a communication problem,
optimizing the transmission rate will be the most important
concern for us.
B. Some Technical Details
In this appendix we present some minor technical details
and tools that are omitted in the main text.
The following proposition quantifies the Shannon entropy
of a distribution that is close to uniform:
Proposition 36. Let X be a probability distribution on a finite
set S, |S| > 4, that is -close to the uniform distribution on
S, for some  ≤ 1/4. Then H(X ) ≥ log2 |S|(1− )
Proof: Let n := |S|, and let f(x) := −x log2 x. The
function f(x) is concave, passes through the origin and is
strictly increasing in the range [0, 1/e]. From the definition,
we have H(X ) = ∑s∈S f(PrX (s)). For each term s in this
summation, the probability that X assigns to s is either at least
1/n, which makes the corresponding term at least log2 n/n
(due to the particular range of |S| and ), or is equal to 1/n−
s, for some s > 0, in which case the term corresponding to
s is less than log2 n/n by at most s log2 n (this follows by
observing that the slope of the line connecting the origin to
the point (1/n, f(1/n)) is log2 n). The bound on the statistical
distance implies that the differences s add up to at most .
Hence, the Shannon entropy of X can be less than log2 n by
at most  log2 n.
Proposition 37. Let (X,Y ) be a pair of random vari-
ables jointly distributed on a finite set Ω × Γ. Then17
EY [dist(X|Y,X)] = EX [dist(Y |X,Y )].
Proof: For x ∈ Ω and y ∈ Γ, we will use shorthands
px, py, pxy to denote Pr[X = x],Pr[Y = y], and Pr[X =
17Here we are abusing the notation and denote by Y the marginal
distribution of the random variable Y , and by Y |(X = a) the distribution of
the random variable Y conditioned on the event X = a.
x, Y = y], respectively. Then we have
EY [dist(X|Y,X)] =
∑
y∈Γ
pydist(X|(Y = y), X)
=
1
2
∑
y∈Γ
py
∑
x∈Ω
|pxy/py − px|
=
1
2
∑
y∈Γ
∑
x∈Ω
|pxy − pxpy|
=
1
2
∑
x∈Ω
px
∑
y∈Γ
|pxy/px − py|
=
∑
x∈Ω
pxdist(Y |(X = x), Y )
= EX [dist(Y |X,Y )].
Proposition 38. Let Ω be a finite set that is partitioned into
subsets S1, . . . , Sk and suppose that X is a distribution on
Ω that is γ-close to uniform. Denote by pi, i = 1, . . . k, the
probability assigned to the event Si by X . Then∑
i∈[k]
pi · dist(X|Si,USi) ≤ 2γ.
Proof: Let N := |Ω|, and define for each i, γi :=∑
s∈Si
∣∣PrX (s)− 1N ∣∣ , so that γ1 + · · · + γk ≤ 2γ. Ob-
serve that by triangle’s inequality, for every i we must have
|pi − |Si|/N | ≤ γi. To conclude the claim, it is enough to
show that for every i, we have dist(X|Si,USi) ≤ γi/pi. This
is shown in the following.
pi · dist(X|Si,USi) =
pi
2
∑
s∈Si
∣∣∣∣PrX (s)pi − 1|Si|
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
s∈Si
∣∣∣∣PrX (s)− pi|Si|
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
s∈Si
∣∣∣∣(PrX (s)− 1N
)
+
1
|Si|
( |Si|
N
− pi
)∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∑
s∈Si
∣∣∣∣PrX (s)− 1N
∣∣∣∣+ 12|Si|∑
s∈Si
∣∣∣∣ |Si|N − pi
∣∣∣∣
≤ γi
2
+
1
2|Si| · |Si|γi = γi.
The following proposition shows that any function maps
close distributions to close distributions:
Proposition 39. Let Ω and Γ be finite sets and f be a
function from Ω to Γ. Suppose that X and Y are probability
distributions on Ω and Γ, respectively, and let X ′ be a
probability distribution on Ω which is δ-close to X . Then if
f(X ) ∼ Y , then f(X ′) ∼+δ Y .
Proof: Let X , X ′ and Y be random variables distributed
according to X , X ′, and Y , respectively. We want to upper-
bound
|Pr[f(X ′) ∈ T ]− Pr[Y ∈ T ]|
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for every T ⊆ Γ. By the triangle inequality, this is no more
than
|Pr[f(X ′) ∈ T ]− Pr[f(X) ∈ T ]|+
|Pr[f(X) ∈ T ]− Pr[Y ∈ T ]| .
Here the summand on the right hand side is upperbounded by
the distance of f(X ) and Y , that is assumed to be at most .
Let T ′ := {x ∈ Ω | f(x) ∈ T}. Then the summand on the
left can be written as
|Pr[X ′ ∈ T ′]− Pr[X ∈ T ′]|
which is at most δ by the assumption that X ∼δ X ′.
C. Omitted Details of the Proof of Corollary 23
Here we prove Corollary 23 for the case c > 1. The
construction is similar to the case c = 1, and in particular
the choice of m and k will remain the same. However, a
subtle complication is that the expander family may not have
a graph with dm vertices and we need to adapt the extractor of
Theorem 22 to support our parameters, still with exponentially
small error. To do so, we pick a graph G in the family with
N vertices, such that
cηmdm ≤ N ≤ cηm+1dm,
for a small absolute constant η > 0 that we are free to choose.
The assumption on the expander family guarantees that such
a graph exists. Let m′ be the smallest integer such that dm
′ ≥
cηmN . Index the vertices of G by integers in [N ]. Note that
m′ will be larger than m by a constant multiplicative factor
that approaches 1 as η → 0.
For positive integers q and p ≤ q, define the function
Modq,p : [q]→ [p] by
Modq,p(x) := 1 + (x mod p).
The extractor SFExt interprets the first m′ symbols of the
input as an integer v, 0 ≤ v < dm′ and performs a walk on
G starting from the vertex Moddm′ ,N (u+ 1), the walk being
defined by the remaining input symbols. If the walk reaches
a vertex u at the end, the extractor outputs ModN,dm(u)− 1,
encoded as a d-ary string of length m. A similar argument as in
Theorem 22 can show that with our choice of the parameters,
the extractor has an exponentially small error, where the error
exponent is now inferior to that of Theorem 22 by O(m),
but the constant behind O(·) can be made arbitrarily small by
choosing a sufficiently small η.
The real difficulty lies with the inverter because Mod is
not a balanced function (that is, all images do not have the
same number of preimages), thus we will not be able to obtain
a perfect inverter. Nevertheless, it is possible to construct an
inverter with a close-to-uniform output in `∞ norm. This turns
out to be as good as having a perfect inverter, and thanks
to the Lemma 40 below, we will still be able to use it to
construct a wiretap protocol with zero leakage. Intuitively, the
reason is that even though we are not working with a perfect
inverter and thus the distribution of the encoding conditioned
on the intruder’s observation will not precisely be a symbol-
fixing source, but it is extremely close to one, and the proof of
Theorem 19 for the case of zero leakage will still go through.
Lemma 40. Suppose that f : [d]n → [d]m is a (k, 2−Ω(m))d
symbol-fixing extractor and that X is a distribution on [d]n
such that ‖X − U[d]n‖∞ ≤ 2−Ω(m)/dn. Denote by X ′ the
distribution X conditioned on any fixing of at most n − k
coordinates. Then f(X ′) ∼2−Ω(m) U[d]m .
Proof: By Proposition 39, it suffices to show that X ′ is
2−Ω(m)-close to an (n, k)d symbol-fixing source. Let S ⊆
[d]m denote the support of X ′, and let /dn be the `∞ distance
between X and U[d]n , so that by our assumption,  = 2−Ω(m).
By the bound on the `∞ distance, we know that PrX (S) is
between |S|dn (1 − ) and |S|dn (1 + ). Hence for any x ∈ S,
PrX ′(x), which is PrX (x)/PrX (S), is between 1|S| · 1−1+ and
1
|S| · 1+1− . This differs from 1/|S| by at most O()/|S|. Hence,
X ′ is 2−Ω(m)-close to US .
In order to invert our new construction, we will need to
construct an inverter Invq,p for the function Modq,p. For that,
given x ∈ [p] we will just sample uniformly in its preimages.
This is where the non-balancedness of Mod causes problems,
since if p does not divide q the distribution Invq,p(U[p]) is not
uniform on [q].
Lemma 41. Suppose that q > p. Given a distribution X on [p]
such that ‖X −U[p]‖∞ ≤ p , we have ‖Invq,p(X )−U[q]‖∞ ≤
1
q · p+qq−p .
Proof: Let X ∼ X and Y ∼ Invq,p(X ). Since we
invert the modulo function by taking for a given output a
random preimage uniformly, Pr[Y = y] is equal to Pr[X =
Modq,p(y)] divided by the number of y with the same value
for Modq,p(y). The latter number is either bq/pc or dq/pe, so
1− 
pdq/pe ≤ Pr(Y = y) ≤
1 + 
pbq/pc
Bounding the floor and ceiling functions by q/p±1, we obtain
1− 
q + p
≤ Pr(Y = y) ≤ 1 + 
q − p
That is
−p− q
q(q + p)
≤ Pr(Y = y)− 1
q
≤ p+ q
q(q − p) ,
which concludes the proof since this is true for all y.
Now we describe the inverter Inv(x) for the extractor. First
the inverter calls InvN,dm(x) to obtain x1 ∈ [N ]. Then it
performs a random walk of length n − m′ on the graph,
starting from x1, to reach a vertex x2 at the end which is
inverted to obtain x3 = Invdm′ ,N (x2) as a d-ary string of
length m′. Finally, the inverter outputs y = (x3, w), where w
corresponds the inverse of the random walk. It is obvious that
this procedure yields a valid preimage of x.
Using the previous lemma, if x is chosen uniformly, x1 will
be at `∞-distance
1 :=
1
N
· d
m
N − dm =
1
N
O(c−ηm).
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For a given walk, the distribution of x2 will just be a
permutation of the distribution of x1 and applying the lemma
again, we see that the `∞-distance of x3 from the uniform
distribution is
2 :=
1
dm′
· N + 1d
m′
dm′ −N =
1
dm′
O(c−ηm).
This is true for all the dn−m
′
possible walks so the `∞-
distance of the distribution of y from uniform is bounded by
1
dnO(c
−ηm). Applying Lemma 40 in an argument similar to
Theorem 19 concludes the proof.
